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Abstract
Public Employment Services (PES) are increasingly 
affected by changes in the economy and labour 
markets. Rather than focusing on the imperative 
for change (what to do), this paper focuses on the 
action (how to do it). Our starting point is that to 
deal with the current changes in governing and 
implementing tasks in advanced economies, PES 
needs new ways of making governance work. The 
aim is to consider how the move from ‘actor’ to 
‘regisseur’ (Conductor) as a model for labour mar-
ket governance affects the role of PES. This new 
role of conductor is a key element of the PES EU 
2020 Strategy Output Paper, adopted at the end 
of the Danish Presidency in June 2012. The pur-
pose of the PES EU 2020 Strategy Output Paper 
is to establish a Vision for PES delivery by 2020. It 
describes the necessary elements to create a mod-
ernised service to deliver the EU 2020 Employment 
Strategy. It calls for a shift from a traditional em-
ployment service to a labour market ‘conductor’. 
Implementing this Vision demands that PES offer 
a wider set of services to enable various transitions 
over the life-cycle and to support new customers 
(workers, inactive groups) with no traditional links 
to PES. PES therefore need to become enabler, 
coach and also a ‘conductor’ and facilitator in the 
labour market by building partnerships with other 
labour market actors. Based on the individual case 
study of the Belgian PES (Flanders), we conclude 
that the label of ‘conducting’ means more than just 
coordination through partnerships and networks. 
In practice, there is an evolution from a single 
mode of governance towards a multiple mode 
combining characteristics from all three modes of 
governance, i.e. hierarchy, markets and networks. 
A key element of the conducting role is the inter-
action with other actors, regardless of the mode 
of governance. Moreover, the mix of governance is 
changing over time. A key factor for PES in our case 
study, and probably also in other advanced PES 
systems, is keeping vital labour market information 
and matching processes under public control in an 
increasingly digitalised labour market. In this way, 
thinking of PES as a conductor is not the end of 
PES as we know but rather the beginning of a pro-
cess of reinventing PES as a prime public service.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we 
briefly introduce the PES 2020 Vision, the intended 
changes to the role of PES and the subsequent 
conductor role as described in the policy document. 
Section 2 gives an overview of the different types 
of governance and meta governance, followed by 
a discussion of how the PES 2020 Strategy refers 
to it. Following this analytical section, section 3 of-
fers an in-depth review of conducting by the Flem-
ish PES based on four main activities: tendering, 
local job shops, public-private partnerships and 
digital services. Finally, section 4 offers a discus-
sion of lessons learned, followed by a conclusion. 
Keywords
Public employment service, conducting, conductor 
role, partnerships, service delivery, governance, 
labour market actors, digital services, PES 2020.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The face of Public Employment Services (PES) has 
changed radically over the past two decades, as 
has the underlying paradigm of public service. 
While academics have studied the causes, pro-
cesses and consequences of the transformation 
of PES in relation to activation policies (e.g. Consi-
dine et al., 2001; Eichhorst et al., 2008; Van Berkel 
et al., 2011; Weishaupt, 2011), only a few, mainly 
historical studies focus on the change in public 
service as a whole (e.g. King, 1995). There is even 
less scientific evidence regarding its future ori-
entation. This paper offers insights into the PES 
2020 Vision, by focusing on the approach of the 
European Network of Public Employment Services1. 
How do they tackle the new role and functions 
of PES in response to fundamental changes in 
labour markets and societies? These new functions 
are intended to support an individual through-
out his/her entire career, instead of focusing on 
the unemployment-employment dichotomy. PES 
will therefore be required to support a number of 
transitions, including the switch from education to 
first job, job-to-job transitions, the transition from 
inactivity to employment, and exit from the labour 
market. This means targeting customers on both 
sides of the labour market, i.e. jobseekers (includ-
ing employees) as well as employers (including 
intermediaries). This vision is rooted in the Transi-
tional Labour Markets (TLM) approach (Schmid & 
Gazier, 2002; Schmid, 2010), which can be seen 
as a new paradigm for PES. 
This new role as conductor in the PES 2020 Strat-
egy, formulated by the Heads of PES and sup-
ported by the Commission, challenges PES’s 
traditional role as a welfare agency. The PES 2020 
Vision represents a radical shift for PES, the ser-
vices they provide and the customer groups they 
serve. This transition is consistent with a new 
mode of governance called ‘conducting’.
PES customers typically exist within a highly com-
plex policy sector, with both a high level of ‘pub-
lic interest’ and a certain level of competition with 
1 The Network was established in 2014 on formal legal 
footing following Decision 573/2014 replacing previous 
voluntary co-operation in the former Heads of PES 
(HoPES) Network.
private intermediaries (Struyven, 2009). The pres-
sure resulting from both political drivers and the 
private market creates a continual challenge for 
PES to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness. 
In our view, this is the main reason that PES have 
focused primarily on a NPM logic (customer-focus) 
rather than a new public service logic (citizen-
focus) (cf. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Hasen-
feld, 2015). In other words, PES reforms were 
first driven by the goals of efficiency and effec-
tiveness through new forms of steering via part-
nership with both public and private profit and 
non-profit agencies. Less central to PES reforms 
were goals related to the promotion of democratic 
governance and the realisation of citizenship. How-
ever, it is important to acknowledge that the PES 
2020 Strategy envisions a value-driven approach, 
promoting the translation of concepts and val-
ues such as equality, honesty, reciprocity, respect, 
social responsibility, professionalism and engage-
ment into everyday service delivery.
The way employment services are organised in 
each country and the institutional characteris-
tics of the organisations delivering these services 
are deeply embedded in the broader political-
administrative structures of the different welfare 
states they operate in. This results in considerable 
cross-country variations in terms of their depar-
ture points. The Vision presented in the PES 2020 
Strategy Paper has been heavily influenced by 
VDAB’s (Public Employment Service of Flanders) 
long-term strategy, as formulated in the so-called 
VONK note (VDAB op Nieuwe Koers [VDAB takes 
a new path]) between 2008 and 2009. 
The PES 2020 Strategy Output Paper contains 
a number of elements already part of VDAB’s 
national agenda which have now been integrated 
into the PES 2020 Vision. Consequently, VDAB has 
been chosen as an individual case study for this 
paper. Several arguments justify reviewing a single 
case study. As explained in section 3, the Flemish 
PES was established in 1988 as a purely service-
oriented provider with, until recently, no responsibil-
ity for delivering benefits and controlling jobseekers. 
As one of the exceptions in the EU, it still has 
authority over competencies and training of both 
jobseekers and workers. From the beginning, the 
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organisation was characterised by relative stabil-
ity and autonomy vis-à-vis subsequent Ministers of 
Employment, creating space for the PES to develop 
a long-term strategy. Furthermore, VDAB was an 
early adopter of computerised labour market infor-
mation and matching2. For these reasons, VDAB is 
an obvious place to experiment with innovative PES 
strategies in Europe. 
In order to better understand the PES conductor 
role(s), this paper provides:
1. An overview of conducting models (including 
stakeholders and actors involved) based  
on existing examples, including how the PES 
conductor role evolved in general and in  
relation to specific intervention areas,  
with a specific focus on digital services;
2. An analysis of the conductor role(s) in terms 
of context, drivers, triggers, types of conduct-
ing strategies and actions, capacity require-
ments, accountability mechanisms  
and coordination with other ‘conductors’;
3. An empirical study of the why, what and  
how of conducting strategies in practice, 
based on the case study of VDAB (PES  
of Belgium Flanders).
2 For that reason, in Section 3 special focus will be  
on labour market information and digital services.
To that effect, we rely on three methods for our 
analysis. Firstly, we look at existing sources and 
perform a secondary analysis of available mate-
rial. Secondly, we conduct a review based on 
the literature on meta governance in order to 
strengthen the analytical foundation of the new 
roles. Thirdly, we produce an in-depth case study 
of the Flemish VDAB, mainly based on interviews3 
with management and stakeholders together with 
research from previous studies4. We pay particular 
attention to the areas of labour market transpar-
ency and digital services.
3 We are grateful to the following respondents in the  
set of interviews specially undertaken for this paper;  
in alphabetic order these are Mireille Gillebeert,  
Sven De Haeck, Ria Deketele, Walter Dobbelaere,  
Sabine Pardaens, Joris Philips, Koen Pollet,  
Willem Vansina – all VDAB staff – and Paul Verschueren 
(Federgon, the peak body of private labour market 
intermediaries in Belgium). 
4 See list of references in annex.
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2. PES 2020 AND THE CONDUCTOR ROLE
2.1 Three types of change
The change in PES’ role envisioned in the PES 
2020 Vision encapsulates three types of changes. 
First, the Vision seeks to establish a new role for 
PES in terms of service provision and target pop-
ulation based on the holistic TLM approach, in 
which a person’s working life is described in tran-
sitions that should be facilitated by the PES sys-
tem5. Secondly, the Vision introduces the role of 
conductor vis-à-vis other actors, including custom-
ers, whether jobseekers or employers. Thirdly, the 
Visions’ changes centre on management changes 
to increase efficiency and effectiveness of service 
provision. These three types of change, however, 
should not be seen in isolation: the management- 
and role-based changes are essentially rooted in 
the move towards a TLM-inspired labour market 
policy. In other words, the aspiration to TLM pro-
vides the initial framework for change at PES level 
as well as in the broader institutional setting of 
the PES system.
In the literature, the focus is mainly either on 
administrative reforms (mostly with a top-down 
approach studying evolutions such as agencifica-
tion6, contracting-out and decentralisation) or on 
the role of PES organisation in the functioning of 
the labour market. Our paper focuses on the gov-
ernance of PES from an operational point of view, 
in combination with the three main functions 
of a PES: job brokerage; intake, registration and 
screening; referral to active labour market instru-
ments (OECD, 2015). The analytical angle draws on 
extensive literature on public sector organisational 
reform, and on PES innovation as well. Because of 
5 In the PES 2020 Strategy Output Paper, the notion  
of PES system is used to allow for their role to be 
performed by non-state actors.
6 Agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous 
organisations that operate at arms’ length of the 
government, to carry out public tasks (regulation, 
service delivery, policy implementation) in a relatively 
autonomous way i.e. there is less hierarchical and political 
influence on their daily operations and they have more 
managerial freedom. Agencies can for example have 
a different financial system and personnel policies, 
although the degrees of financial, personnel, and 
management autonomy vary by (type of) organisation 
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).
the importance of linking public management and 
organisation to public institutions’ role and func-
tions, we also build on insights from public man-
agement theory, (see Bouckaert et al., 2010; Hill & 
Hupe, 2002; Lægreid et al., 2011; Pollitt & Bouck-
aert, 2004) and on analytical and empirical studies 
on employment services7.
We start by outlining the PES 2020 Vision, and con-
sider how PES currently perceive themselves in this 
context. 
2.2 ‘Conducting’ as a key strategy 
for PES
In 2010, under the Belgian presidency, the heads of 
all three Belgian PES and the Commission launched 
an initiative to link PES strategic positioning with the 
new 2020 employment guidelines adopted by the 
European Council in December 2010. The Commis-
sion’s discussion note on ‘Making Transitions Pay’ 
(MTP) invited PES to take a position on the subject, 
while the view of EMCO8 on MTP (approved by EPSCO 
on 21 October 2010) was to encourage the Com-
mission to work with the Heads of PES (HoPES) Net-
work in order to share information and analysis on 
best practices. This high level debate resulted in the 
PES 2020 Vision adopted at the end of the Danish 
Presidency in June 2012 (HoPES, 2012). Throughout 
this process, there was broad consensus on the cen-
tral role of PES in increasing labour market partici-
pation (Guideline 7). PES largely agreed on their role 
to improving links between supply and demand of 
labour and to offer tailor-made services, particularly 
for client groups with specific needs. 
7 See Thuy et al., 2001; Considine, 2001; Sol & Westerveld, 
2005; Struyven & Steurs, 2005; De Koning & Mosley, 
2002; Bredgaard & Larsen, 2008; Schmid, 2010; 
Weishaupt, 2011; O’Sullivan & Considine, 2015. This 
paper also took advantage from a number of previous 
studies under the PES to PES dialogue as well as other 
work done under the PARES initiative (see references  
in annex).
8 The Employment Committee (EMCO) is the main advisory 
committee for Employment and Social Affairs Ministers  
in the Employment and Social Affairs Council (EPSCO) 
in the employment field. It operates within the policy 
framework of the European Employment Strategy. 
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Strengthening personalised services, offering 
early-stage support, prioritising vulnerable groups 
and extending services to inactive groups are 
objectives shared by all PES throughout Europe. 
There is, however, less of a consensus on the role 
of PES in the development of a skilled workforce 
(Guideline 8). This makes sense since not all PES 
are responsible for providing training and services 
to groups other than the unemployed.
The PES 2020 Strategy Paper highlights balanc-
ing the supply and demand of labour as the core 
business of PES. To prioritise this function, the 
Vision advocates that “Public Employment Ser-
vices should approach labour demand and sup-
ply from a more holistic point of view which takes 
into account the multiple transitions present-
ing themselves continuously on the labour mar-
ket and during individual careers” (HoPES, 2012). 
This is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
EU 2020 Strategy, such as increasing the employ-
ment rate and reducing the number of bottleneck 
vacancies. This type of holistic approach entails 
“a shift from functioning (only) as service provid-
ers towards (also) functioning as service seekers, 
that compose scenarios for the most qualitative, 
effective and efficient constellation of services to 
meet a specific need on the labour market” (ibid). 
With regard to service delivery, the PES 2020 Strat-
egy document argues for an increase in services 
delivered by different actors through “intensifying 
partnerships with private employment services’ as 
well as other public, not-for-profit and profit actors 
in other policy domains such as education and wel-
fare.” This is identified in the Paper as “conduct-
ing”, a key term for PES to achieve the objectives 
of Europe 2020. 
The different “levels of conducting” are described 
here (ibid):
 ● enhancing labour market transparency and 
providing evidence to support policy design;
 ● securing standards for active labour market 
policies;
 ● identifying labour market needs and availa-
ble service offers;
 ● matching citizens and employers with appro-
priate and accessible services;
 ● enabling labour market actors to cooperate 
and innovate;
 ● commissioning market operation and part-
nership formation;
 ● aligning labour market actors with labour 
market policy/labour market needs (by 
selecting, certifying, coordinating, directing, 
managing);
 ● acting as supplemental service providers 
where market failure occurs.
These are the recommended successive steps within 
the core role of labour market conducting. This role 
should be seen as a layered concept, involving dif-
ferent tasks that can be executed to varying degrees. 
In this respect, no contradiction between different 
roles is mentioned in the PES 2020 Vision. Apply-
ing this type of lifecycle approach means the target 
group for PES expands to encompass new “custom-
ers” (i.e. workers, inactive groups) who may not have 
traditional links to the PES. PES therefore need to 
act as both enabler and coach (by informing citizens 
and investing in them while they make transitions), 
but also as a “conductor” and facilitator in the labour 
market (by building partnerships with other labour 
market actors and managing contracting-out prac-
tices rather than keeping services in-house). 
For the individual customer, this means that PES 
will be involved both at the point of job placement 
and in broader skills development and life-long 
learning activities. Moreover, PES clearly state that 
they aim to become more demand-driven, mean-
ing a substantial increase in the current level of 
collaboration with employers. Although some con-
cepts and suggestions are rather abstract, allowing 
for different interpretations in national contexts, the 
Vision describes some of the common operational 
and management consequences of PES’ new roles 
and functions. As such, a lot of attention is paid to 
optimising PES performance through improved effi-
ciency and efficacy. It also touches on the new role 
of technology in achieving this.
In summary , the main building blocks underpinning 
the PES 2020 Vision centre on four important topics 
for PES: the conducting role and partnerships; skills 
development and career services; employer services; 
and sustainable activation. The label ‘conducting’ can 
be considered as the cornerstone, involving several 
layers or activities and ways of working. Some of 
them are meant to have direct influence on ser-
vice provision and actor; others have a more indirect 
influence on service provision. 
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3.1 Modes of operational governance
With a strong focus on partnerships and multiple 
roles, the PES 2020 Strategy Paper touches on both 
the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of strategic goals. However, 
this concept of ‘partnership’ conceals a wide range of 
relationships, with varying degrees of self-governing, 
steering, intensity, scale, duration and intention. The 
same is true for the ‘network’ concept, closely related 
to partnerships (See Brown & Keast, 2003). With the 
need to cope with increasingly complex and chang-
ing environments, PES need to find answers on how 
to act. Action may take many forms, depending on 
context, motivation and capacities. 
Following theoretical approaches developed since 
Etzioni (1961), Lindblom (1977), Kaufmann et al. 
(1986) and Thompson et al. (1991), three general 
models of social coordination stand out. These are 
known as the ‘trinity’ of i) hierarchies, ii) markets and 
iii) networks. Some authors (see above) refer to the 
trinity as organisational settings, others refer to it in 
terms of modes of governance, namely the forms 
governance can take in practice (Milward & Provan, 
2000; Hill & Hupe, 2002). Typically:
 ● When the organisation mode is hierarchical, it 
requires “effective methods of command and 
the use of coercion or threat to ensure compli-
ance with authoritative rules”. 
 ● In the market mode of organisation, the prob-
lem of compliance will be perceived as “rooted 
in self-interested behaviour”. 
 ● Network or “community” organisational forms 
“rely on the operation of custom, tradition, 
common moral codes, values, beliefs, love, 
a sense of belonging to a ‘clan’ (Ouchi, 1991), 
reciprocity, solidarity and trust” (Parsons, 1995: 
518-519). 
It is not enough to focus on one mode of govern-
ance as a universal panacea and to dismiss the oth-
ers. Paraphrasing Parsons (1995), in the real world 
of PES there are almost nothing but combinations. 
Other authors state that “it is the mix that matters” 
(Rhodes, 1997; Keast et al., 2004). In current dis-
cussions around PES, there seems to be a move 
towards increased partnership and less hierarchy, 
although there is a question on the practice. How 
are different modes interrelated? Are they really to 
be understood as new expressions of governance, 
leaving behind more bureaucratic approaches? 
When does market-type or network type coordina-
tion turn into a hierarchical mode of governance? 
Is there really a switch away from the hierarchi-
cal mode?
In their seminal work on policy implementation, Hill 
and Hupe (2002) further elaborate on the three 
modes of governance by linking circumstances and 
management. Hill and Hupe’s taxonomy clarifies 
what is happening in the evolution of PES (also see 
Table 1 below): 
 ● Starting with the first mode of governance  
“by enforcement”, the central subject of action 
here is regulation and imposition. The deliv-
ery of products and services is seen as hav-
ing a non-excludable (public good) character, 
such as considering entitlement to and pay-
ing unemployment benefits or administering 
a vacancy database. The term “government” 
refers to PES as a political-administrative actor 
operating under a legitimate mandate that  
justifies the government’s monopoly position. 
This role as governmental actor has  
been labelled a Chief Executive Officer. 
 ● To the extent that PES move towards contract-
ing with other public and private providers, 
they govern “by performance”. Action consists 
of creating frameworks in which other actors 
can perform. At the same time, compliance and 
results need monitoring to ensure that delivery 
frameworks function properly. The role of PES/
government is that of an Inspector. In this type 
of contracting-out, the PES itself is not neces-
sarily a purchaser, a role that an administrative 
department or any other public authority can 
perform. Once a market based system  
is established, an inspection is needed to  
monitor proper market functioning. 
 ● A third mode of governance is called  
“co-production”; here an invitation to partic-
ipate is central. PES and other actors work 
together to achieve shared objectives. PES 
takes the role of Regisseur (or ‘conductor’)  
and invites, other actors to collaborate.  
Here, PES are asked to make reflective choices 
about modes of governance and governance  
tools (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).
3. DIFFERENT TYPES OF GOVERNANCE
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Which of the three modes PES choose depends 
on a combination of factors, including political 
will and ideology. Hill and Hupe (2002) identify 
two key factors: the level of ambition and the 
level of dependency from other actors. They state 
that: “when the level of ambitions and the level of 
independence are high, a governance role as CEO 
seems appropriate. When on the other hand ambi-
tions are high but there is a large dependency on 
others, a governance role as Regisseur fits (…) in 
circumstances characterised in-between9 (…) the 
governance role can be one of setting the struc-
ture (cf. the market) and monitoring its functioning 
(the role of the Inspector)” (p. 186).
What is the PES view of these three modes of 
operational governance?
9 Circumstances in-between may be for instance an 
awareness that other service providers than oneself  
can do the job better combined with moderate  
ambitions as the state’s own service provider.
GOVERNANCE ROLE ‘CEO’ ‘INSPECTOR’ ‘REGISSEUR’
Fitting mode  
of operational 
governance
‘Enforcement’ 
(Management via inputs)
Performance’ 
(Management via outputs) 
‘Co-production’/ 
‘Co-creation’ 
(Management via 
outcomes as shared 
results)
Central mechanism ‘Rules’ ‘Contracts’ ‘Trust’
Managing intra-  
and inter-
organisational 
relations
Creating clarity on tasks 
and competences
Taking care of sufficient 
resources
Realising compliance 
to standard operating 
procedures
Leadership
Creating level-playing 
field
Enhancing contract 
compliance
Enhancing and 
maintaining service 
orientation
Rewarding target 
compliance
(Helping) realising 
partnerships
Enhancing 
professionalisation
Sharing resources
Fostering innovation
Communication flows  
in both ways
CIRCUMSTANCES
Ambitions High
Legitimate government 
monopoly
Moderate
Possibility to specifiy 
standards of performance
High 
Complex services 
requiring high levels  
of creativity
Dependency on other 
actors
Low 
Technical competence 
in-house
Moderate 
Availability of other 
potential agents
High 
Need for a more creative 
relationship
Source: adaptation from Hill and Hupe (2002)
Table 1 : Modes of operational governance
3.2 Governance in PES 2020  
Strategy
The picture painted by the PES 2020 Strategy, 
Paper of conducting at each stage of the process 
– even as an actor providing services – limits the 
role of PES. Looking deeper, three distinct modes 
of governance and related coordination instru-
ments can be phased out by using a single part-
nership metaphor. This highlights the following: 
1. The Vision hints at the need for a value-driven 
approach and horizontal coordination via 
a single point of contact for citizens. Think-
ing of PES as a facilitator and conductor of 
labour market partnerships can be seen as 
a call for constructive collaboration between 
trusted partners – hence networking. Partner-
ships and networking usually involve a wider 
range of actors, including schools, employer 
organisations, local governments, pursuing 
common goals of public interest. The Vision 
also touches on another mode of market 
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coordination. Indeed a major section in the 
PES 2020 Strategy document refers to the 
renewal of the internal organisation and  
management of the PES. These types of 
reforms often follow New Public Management 
concepts and tools, such as performance  
management, decentralisation and compet-
itive tendering. Surprisingly, tendering and 
voucher systems are hardly mentioned, even 
though in practice these are central to the 
recent evolution of PES. 
2. The metaphorical and superficial use of  
partnership can be partly explained by the fact 
that, in reality, no single model of tendering, 
i.e. networking, exists. Hybrids are much more 
common than pure forms, which are currently 
in place only in Great Britain, until recently  
in The Netherlands, for defined periods in 
Denmark, or at specific stages of implemen-
tation in Australia (Struyven, 2014). In some 
countries, the tendering model may even be 
closer to a co-production model, while in  
others it is a hybrid between the hierarchical 
and contracting models (e.g. Australia).
3. Looking at shifting modes of governance, 
the “partnership lifecycle” is very important 
(Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998, p.320). In a  
pre-partnership collaboration, PES can invite 
actors to make a particular contribution.  
At this stage, the network mode dominates. 
Once a partnership has been created, hierar-
chy establishes formal procedures. Next, part-
nership service delivery takes place through 
market mechanisms of tendering and con-
tract. In partnership termination, there is  
a re-assertion of a network governance mode. 
Problems in establishing a market and  
steering it towards a government’s goals are 
typical for emerging market models, because 
market coordination is inherently driven by  
an actor’s own interest. In the same way,  
a co-production model inherently raises 
problems of accountability – who carries 
the responsibility when actors are jointly 
responsible?
4. Finally, the term ‘conductor’ invites PES to 
take advantage of new forms of collabora-
tion. Conducting is an overarching concept 
that leaves a lot of room for interpretation 
and implementation. Indeed: Does conduct-
ing mean the same as coordination, steering, 
commissioning? Or does it refer to all types 
of collaboration with other actors (other than 
contracting-out)? What difference does  
it make in practice? Is it compatible for PES  
to be a credible labour market conductor and 
at the same time as being a substantial ser-
vice provider? In this paper, we state that the 
fundamental element of conducting is the 
interaction with other actors, not just in rela-
tion with a network mode of governance but 
with all three modes of governance.
Before returning to these questions, the next section 
discusses the role of the PES as a ‘meta governor’.
3.3 Meta governance roles
The term ‘labour market governance’ denotes a pro-
cess in which a number of public and private actors 
interact to govern the labour market. This stems from 
the fact that PES have become a differentiated, frag-
mented and multi-centred institution dealing simul-
taneously with benefits, labour market information, 
job brokerage, activation, training, and even career 
guidance. The dividing line between public and pri-
vate is blurred because governance is often produced 
by networks involving all types of actors. This sits in 
contrast with PES operating in a top-down bureau-
cratic system of hierarchical rule. 
When complex labour market issues and capaci-
ties are scattered between different actors, indirect 
ways of influencing and coordinating the actions 
of self-governing actors or networks are needed. 
Meta governance is an indirect form of governing, 
performed by influencing various processes of self-
governance. This involves the management of com-
plexity and plurality through the “organisation of 
self-organisation” (Sørensen, 2006). Sørensen, later 
refined by Sørensen and Torfing (2009), identifies 
four distinct ways of metagovernance of self-gov-
erning actors (cf. Temmerman et al., 2015). 
 ● The first role is “hands-off” network design. 
According to the authors, this role aims to 
“influence the scope, character, composition 
and institutional procedures of the network” 
(p. 246). In the network design role, PES seek 
to create social and political meaning in the 
identity of the network. 
 ● The second role is network framing. PES set 
out the goals, financial conditions and admin-
istrative basis for the network. 
 ● The third role is network support and 
facilitation. 
 ● In the fourth role of participation, PES become 
one of the members of the network.
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In terms of the Conductor role vis-à-vis self-gov-
erning actors, these range from distant “hands-
off” to “hands-on” roles. “Hands-off” means not 
directly interfering in operations, whereas “hands-
on” means interacting directly with the self-govern-
ing actors. The authors describe “hands-on” as in no 
way assertive, but substantively neutral, simply to 
promote actions by other actors. 
The question remains then: in which situations 
is meta governance the only applicable form of 
labour market governance? If meta governance 
is believed to be the only applicable form, which 
type of meta governance is the most applicable in 
which situation? Although PES may be in a good 
position, meta governance is not only exercised 
by PES, but also by various actors at regional and 
local levels in the labour market ecosystem. Fol-
lowing governance theorists, meta governance can 
indeed potentially be exercised by any resourceful 
actor – public or private (Sørensen, 2006, p. 103).
3.4 Meta governance in PES 2020 
Strategy
Various indirect ways of influencing and coordi-
nating the actions of other self-governing actors 
in the labour market gives PES more scope to sup-
port them or become one of them. Several lessons 
can be learned from this. 
In the role as meta governor, PES should adopt 
a mix of “hands-off” and “hands-on” roles. Meta 
governor role-playing is dependent on the objec-
tives and contexts in which it should happen. But, 
particularly in mandated networks, how is their 
right to exercise rules reconciled with the practi-
calities of meta governance role-playing? Firstly, 
networks or partnerships supplement hierarchy 
rather than replacing it (Laegreid et al., 2015a). 
It might typically be associated with policy net-
works, but the meta governor role can also help 
in a service delivery context where PES activities 
involve managing internal and external relations 
to comply with standard operating procedures 
and reward target compliance. This is different 
from a policy network context, where PES activi-
ties involve appealing for responsibility and realis-
ing partnerships to “make it happen”. Current PES 
often operate in both. 
The mere existence of hierarchy-based coordination 
instruments in network settings is not a problem on 
its own, but it should not be allowed to dominate 
because it threatens the self-governing capacity of 
partnerships (Temmerman et al., 2015). To analyse 
precisely how each role should be played in practice, 
several strategies come into play, based on how 
far the “shadow of hierarchy” is actively deployed. 
Deployment of hierarchy can be useful or even nec-
essary to protect the public interest from negative 
compromises and practices (Hill & Hupe, 2002). 
After all, hierarchy is a strong coordination mecha-
nism (Laegreid et al., 2015, p. 935). It may prevent 
unwanted effects of networking arrangements, e.g. 
when a private actor prescribes its own model or 
employs self-seeking tactics against PES or other 
actors. But it may also lead to exactly the opposite 
of an intended pre-partnership stage and under-
mine shared goals. Particularly within the context 
of service delivery, there is a new tension between 
meta governance role-playing and preserving and 
securing a public service. 
The “hands-off” roles of network design and fram-
ing are particularly promising when it comes to 
finding innovative solutions and mobilising the 
expertise and resources of other actors to deal with 
repeated job transitions and transitions between 
working and learning, caring or job seeking. PES 
strategy mentions “the capability to constitute 
partnerships, enable cooperation and compose net-
works” as the “strategic conducting function that 
PES are acquiring or have to acquire” (Leroy & De 
Haeck, 2014). This is because “PES have to extend 
their own mediation and guidance services with 
those of other public and private service providers” 
(p. 44). This is particularly useful where PES need 
to anticipate and react quickly to meet labour mar-
ket challenges (e.g. employment integration of ref-
ugees). A precondition is that PES and government 
policy goals align. However in a context of increas-
ing target setting at the European policy level (e.g. 
Youth Guarantee), there is also an increasing risk 
that supranational policy goals are not in line with 
genuine policy challenges at regional and sub-
regional level. Also conceivable are cases where 
PES execute “hands-on” roles without taking the 
lead in operational delivery. However, in general 
they do not exist for long as room for manoeu-
vre is limited because PES are forced to deploy 
scarce resources to meet organisational targets. 
Indeed, PES require considerable discretion from 
government if they want to act as a meta gover-
nor in networks conducted by other actors. Another 
important precondition is to create a balance 
between vertical organisation-specific accounta-
bility and horizontal cross-cutting accountability. 
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4. THE CASE OF THE BELGIAN PES  
IN FLANDERS (VDAB)
4.1 Introduction
Not only does multiple role-playing require room 
for manoeuvre and a relatively autonomous 
organisation, it also rests on adequate corporate 
governance and organisational structure. VDAB is 
an organisation that “pushes constant learning, 
co-creation, innovating” (Leroy & De Haeck, 2014). 
In its own terms, “PES ought to pursue constant 
service design renewal and organisational maturity 
upgrading in view of increasing responsiveness to 
changing labour market needs” (p. 45). PES must 
reinvent themselves. Core functions of mediation, 
registration and activation are at stake. Stated this 
way, the main driver for PES is to reposition itself 
as an indispensable and leading conductor of the 
labour market. However, this inevitably causes 
concern within the PES system and the implemen-
tation of this imperative is very complex.
This section contains an analysis of expanding and 
evolving conductor roles based on the Flemish PES 
as a case study. After an introduction to VDAB’s 
structure, reforms and transition into a conducting 
organisation, four sub-sections focus more spe-
cifically on the PES’s conducting across four main 
activities: contracting-out through tendering; co-
production through local job shops; public-private 
partnerships; co-creation through digital services.
4.2 Organisational structure
VDAB is the public actor in the Flemish labour mar-
ket. It enjoys the status of an externally autono-
mous government agency, and is run jointly by 
the Flemish representatives of employer organ-
isations and trade unions (the “social partners”). 
Following the second state reform in 1988, unem-
ployment insurance schemes remained the respon-
sibility of the federal social security institution RVA, 
while responsibility for job brokerage and reinte-
gration of jobseekers passed mainly into the hands 
of the Flemish government and VDAB. Unemploy-
ment benefits are paid by the National Employment 
Office (RVA) while other relevant social benefits (the 
so-called minimum income recipients) are paid by 
the municipal Public Centres for Social Welfare 
(OCMW). The PES oversees the initial registration 
of unemployment and the monitoring and sanction-
ing of jobseekers’ availability to work10. VDAB’s per-
formance is assessed against the goals and targets 
set out in the Yearly Business Plans11. The current 
government decided to dispense with the (5 year) 
Management Contracts from 2016 onwards, which 
may mean less room for VDAB to make its own 
strategic choices.
Provincial management boards are established, at 
sub-regional level, under the responsibility of head 
office. They in turn are responsible for the 13 labour 
market management offices. These have a front 
office function only, with everyday management 
responsibilities brought together at a higher level. 
Within local communities, PES operates around 
90 job shops (werkwinkels)12. These job shops are 
intended as a single point-of-contact for people 
seeking employment. They combine PES services 
with those provided by the municipality and other 
actors, including the social welfare centres (OCMW) 
and organisations providing assistance to people 
with work disabilities. In addition, most cities and 
larger municipalities have a competence centre for 
professional training. The management of these 
was already largely established at the intermedi-
ate provincial level, but they will now be coordi-
nated by the management board at provincial level, 
alongside local job shops. 
The reinforcement of decision-making power at 
VDAB’s provincial level, introduced in 2012, was 
intended to increase coordination between the medi-
ation and activation services, as well as the training 
services. A large part of VDAB’s budget is spent on in-
house training services for both the unemployed and 
employed. Integrating the competence centres aimed 
10 Since the latest (sixth) state reform in 2014, finally  
the monitoring and sanctioning competence has been 
referred too to the regional PES and implemented  
from January 2016. 
11 VDAB was the first public agency in Flanders for whom 
the Flemish government made use of multi-annual 
management contracts, practiced from 1993 until 
recently (2015). 
12 Derived from 134 job shops in the early 2000s, which 
corresponds on average with 1 shop per 3 municipalities. 
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to simplify the tendering process by organising it at 
provincial level for both competence centres and 
labour market management offices. This approach 
creates more room for smaller external providers.
4.3 The quest for a new VDAB role
The quest for a new definition of the role of the 
VDAB began in 1999 and took a decisive turn in 
2003. The new government coalition took the new 
ILO Convention no. 181 as an opportunity to launch 
a radical shake-up. The relevant passage from the 
government coalition agreement stated that: 
“As a result of the recent International Labour 
Organisation Convention, the labour market has 
been opened up to private intermediaries. These 
intermediaries play a vital role in the labour mar-
ket and each contributes in its own way to better 
coordination of the market. To foster this, the role 
of the VDAB must change from that of a central 
actor to the steering role of a central ‘regisseur’. 
This steering function will mean that the VDAB 
enters into cooperation agreements with the pri-
vate sector to ensure the efficient and transparent 
functioning of the labour market and increasingly 
develops into a support organisation for that mar-
ket. The services it provides are moreover com-
plementary to the qualitative services provided by 
other intermediaries, and particular care will be 
given to safeguarding the provision of services for 
those at risk in the labour market” (Flemish Coali-
tion Agreement, 1999).
The Flemish Parliament supported this shift and 
agreed the motion calling for, among others, (1) 
a clear separation between the steering (‘regie’) and 
implementation (‘actor’) functions to ensure trans-
parency of the public provision, and (2) full integra-
tion of the private sector in the service delivery. 
Firstly, the intention was that the existing public ser-
vice, which for a long time had enjoyed a monopoly, 
should be transformed into a conducting function 
(the regisseur role), with reference to the role of the 
government relative to the entire field of intermedi-
aries. Secondly, the government was keen to embed 
the notion of ‘basic’ services in the public service, 
with the remainder of the service delivery carried 
out by private players. At that time, the notion of 
basic services referred to the entire body of services 
involved in applying for benefits, screening appli-
cants and managing their intake.
More than 15 years later, VDAB now has a divi-
sion responsible for its conducting functions, 
known as the ‘Regie’ Department. Currently, ten-
dering, partnership management, labour market 
information and European funds all fall under its 
remit. The expenses for other actors amount to 
17 percent of the total annual VDAB budget. Over 
time, conducting emerged in four main activities: 
contracting-out through tendering; co-production 
through local job shops; public-private partner-
ships; co-creation through digital services. All of 
them are labelled as conducting, for every activity 
without exception. The next four sections focus on 
conducting in each of these four activities. 
4.4 PES as a conductor of partner-
ships through tendering
Contracting-out, or tendering of employment and 
training services, is the first domain in which con-
ducting is critical. 
In Flanders, tendering initiatives emerged in 2004 
with the political aim to expand and modernise the 
playing field by inviting tenders for assistance to 
jobseekers. An important driver was the increased 
effort to encourage job-search behaviour among 
jobseekers, which was set out in the 2004 coop-
eration agreement for activation policy13. However, 
it is important to clarify the policy objective. Firstly, 
the primary objective is not to reduce the volume 
of public execution but to organise it differently. 
Secondly, the responsibility for the execution of the 
tendering model is with the PES in its capacity as 
contracting authority. Thirdly, VDAB already had 
experience in organising the outsourcing of training. 
There is nothing intrinsically new in this but what 
is different is that it is being organised in line with 
the Law on Public Procurement, hence the use of 
the instrument ‘call for tenders’. The aim is to make 
projects more demand-oriented and to attract new 
players. Furthermore, tenders for region-specific 
training packages are relatively small packages. In 
practical terms, this process means:
13 Cooperation agreement regarding active assistance  
for and monitoring of job search behaviour concluded  
on 30 April 2004 between the federal government,  
the regions and the communities.
16
16
 ● Both training packages and employment 
assistance tasks have shifted towards com-
peting private (commercial and non-commer-
cial) organisations. The content is contractually 
stipulated by the PES (as the contracting 
authority), and one or more service providers 
are contractors. 
 ● The public service responsible for the registra-
tion and allocation or maintenance of a job-
seeker’s allowance refers the jobseeker to the 
service provider(s). In principle, the jobseeker 
can choose between multiple service providers. 
 ● Generally, candidates who are referred to 
a provider cannot simply be refused  
or referred back to the public service that 
referred them. The idea here is to create 
a barrier that prevents creaming by focus-
sing on jobseekers who are easier to place. 
Moreover, PES oversees the execution of the 
contract, monitors placement outcomes and 
continues to manage the jobseeker’s dossier. 
 ● VDAB is still responsible for a given ‘basic’  
service (registration, first intake, referral as men-
tioned earlier) and does not have to buy services 
from private service providers for all jobseekers. 
 ● Generally, VDAB offers limited in-house  
services for recently registered jobseekers, 
while more intensive services for specific  
target groups are left to the market players.
There is a potential conflict of interest in the var-
ious roles when PES, as contracting authority and 
in-house service provider, decides which service pro-
viders the jobseeker is referred to (internal, public 
or external, private). Consequently, PES becomes the 
“judge and jury”, which questions the legitimacy of 
the public service’s activities, even though in practice 
there is no conflict around the referral of candidates 
to market players.
The process is then played out by autonomous 
actors. These hold a double position and, to a cer-
tain extent, this applies to commercial, non-commer-
cial private actors and even to various public actors: 
on the one hand they defend the public interest, but 
on the other they also pose a risk as both social and 
economic actors. This implies that they cooperate as 
well as compete to achieve a given outcome as effi-
ciently as possible. How the actors prove their worth 
is very complex and various relationships are created 
between the actors:
1. between the jobseeker as customer and the 
placement service, and between the customer 
and the provider. Both are a professional rela-
tionship, a relationship of trust;
2. between the jobseeker as a requesting party in 
the service providers’ market: this in principle 
presumes freedom of choice and competition;
3. between the PES as contracting authority  
and the service provider: this is a competitive 
relationship which turns into a principal/agent 
relationship;
4. between the service providers: this either 
involves cooperation or competition;
5. between the PES which provides a basic  
service and referrals, among others, and the 
service provider: this in principle is a profes-
sional relationship involving coordination  
and exchange of information.
These relationships develop against the backdrop of 
economic and professional contexts, which overlaps 
for each of the three actors (the contracting author-
ity, the service provider and the jobseeker). This is 
shown in the figure on the next page.
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The new constellation creates a new level of com-
plexity as designing a coherent and stable system 
becomes more difficult. This stems from the rigor-
ous demands of design, management and organisa-
tion of the system (see, inter alia, Stiglitz, 1988; Le 
Grand & Bartlett, 1993; Struyven, 2004; Struyven & 
Steurs, 2005; O’Sullivan & Considine, 2015). At the 
same time, each tendering system must consider the 
appropriateness of the policy goals that are imple-
mented by market governance and the organisation 
of that system within the framework of current legis-
lation on public procurement. This leads to five fields 
of tension:
 ● competition based on price versus quality-
based competition;
 ● low access thresholds versus quality and 
innovation;
 ● transaction costs versus competition;
 ● client’s freedom of choice versus activation 
duties;
 ● result-driven versus process-driven.
In a tender, each choice has implications for one of 
these parameters. Choices impact upon each other 
and the consequences will vary depending on the 
actors’ characteristics and strategies. We can expect 
differences between commercial and non-com-
mercial organisations, or between large and small 
organisations. 
As mentioned in section 2, there is no single model 
of tendering. Anyone following the developments 
in these markets in other countries will realise that 
there is no single model for organisation and that 
design choices in countries with greater public mar-
ket tendering experience also vary (Finn, 2011). 
This can be explained by the objectives and experi-
ences of previous tender processes, and how actors 
(commercial and non-commercial) anticipate these 
(Struyven, 2014). 
Having experienced successive tendering for more 
than 10 years, it is generally acknowledged that 
the involvement of private actors has helped gov-
ernments to achieve their activation goals. VDAB 
focusses on improvements in quality assurance and 
monitoring. The choices between successive tenders 
are also changing in Flanders and thus influence the 
market in terms of development and the services 
on offer. In addition, more knowledge of the poten-
tial market is needed to identify which actors have 
expertise in which solutions. VDAB, in its own words, 
is attached to good partnerships and healthy mar-
ket relationships. 
In theory, this should mean that the types of ser-
vice providers vary, with a mix of large and small 
players, commercial and non-commercial players. 
At the same time, tasks should be clearly divided 
between the PES and the external service providers, 
and the policy strategy to develop a public market 
should be consistent. 
Figure 1: Types of relationships between actors in the tendering model
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However in practice, VDAB’s senior management 
acknowledges that they are forced to tender for 
compliance with the Law on Public Procurement, 
regardless of the target group and type of services. 
Tendering as an instrument is not always appropri-
ate to specific aims, in particular when it comes to 
innovation or specialised expertise (e.g. only pro-
vided by NGOs). 
Furthermore, in Flanders, NGOs currently seem to 
have less chance at winning large tenders that cover 
broader, wide geographical areas. On the other hand, 
the main body of private providers in Belgium com-
plain about VDAB’s case-by-case approach, claiming 
that there is no specific policy around calls for tender. 
In addition, the government’s perception is that com-
mercial and non-commercial players are each other’s 
competitors, while in reality they complement one 
another. It remains that opportunities for investment, 
specialisation and cross-pollination are too limited 
(Struyven & Van Parys, 2009).
Finally, private providers can feel forced to move 
into a reference framework for pricing and for 
measuring results, which does not always take into 
account ’specific contract requirements. Such rec-
ommended prices are often based on VDAB’s own 
estimates of the time needed to provide a spe-
cific service, which in turn has contributed to pric-
ing strategies from providers that are too low to 
develop a given market (Ibid.).
To sum up the above points, while the policy dis-
course continues to call for cooperation and equiv-
alence (instead of market forces and competition), 
the tendering process, as an instrument of the mar-
ket-mode governance, practically results in the use 
of hierarchical instruments represented in an author-
ity-mode of governance (e.g. quality assurance and 
monitoring; reference framework for pricing and 
result measurement). This evolution diminishes the 
chance for meta governor roles to emerge.
One alternative to the above mentioned complexity, 
which is typical of tender systems, consists of vouch-
ers or individual accounts. These alternatives do exist 
in Flanders for employees’ career guidance and train-
ing and the VDAB has become the central point of 
information and purchase of vouchers. But this is not 
seen as part of the conducting role.  
4.5 PES as a conductor  
of local job centres
The second domain of conducting for VDAB relates 
to local job shops (werkwinkels), which began in 
the early 2000s. The government wanted to bring 
together related services, which until then had been 
divided between different bodies to avoid access 
thresholds and overlap. The local ‘job shops’ model 
was the result, a sort of one-stop shop per munic-
ipality or group of municipalities under the joint 
management of VDAB and the municipalities. To 
reach all jobseekers, basic services became the 
responsibility of VDAB, meaning they could not be 
outsourced. Other services could be provided by 
private players as part of the trajectory guidance. 
The distribution of steering was as follows: VDAB is 
responsible for the integrated service together with 
the other partners in the job shop; the municipalities 
are responsible for the development of the local 
service economy. In reality, only the first task came 
to fruition, with the local job shop primarily run by 
VDAB. Initially the intention was that the local job 
shop should be formed like a cooperative structure 
and established under separate decree. However, 
this decree stalled at the draft stage. In 2004, the 
job shops therefore acquired a legal basis via the 
founding decree for VDAB.
VDAB has been in charge of these job shops from 
the outset, although their mission is to create an inte-
grated service (a service provided in collaboration with 
other partners). Counsellors helping jobseekers with 
basic services such as registration and job search, and 
jobseekers’ trajectory supervisors both have a place in 
the job shop. In this sense, the job shop is intended to 
work as a gateway to other actors. 
However, in practice integrated service delivery 
between VDAB and local social services never hap-
pened and there is an institutional explanation for 
this. The extension of one-stop shops to unemploy-
ment and other means-tested benefits is limited in 
Belgium by the constitutional division of responsi-
bilities between different policy levels. Firstly, the 
national Benefits Agency (RVA) in Belgium is not for-
mally involved with the local job centres, although it 
was not prohibited from doing this. Secondly, social 
assistance benefits remain the responsibility of the 
federal government and are organised within the 
municipalities by their public centres for social wel-
fare (OCMW: Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschap-
pelijk Welzijn). An important principle of integrated 
services is the creation of one file per client (a single 
view of the customer): client data is collected by all 
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partners using a single computer system, the PES Cli-
ent Monitoring System. In practice, this does not yet 
function properly as registering at an employment 
offices is not a prerequisite to qualify for social assis-
tance. Research evaluating pilots in five locations and 
other bottom-up initiatives for better collaboration 
between VDAB and OCMW have led to different solu-
tions at different locations, both in terms of content 
and size/scope (Van Mellaert, Kuppens & Struyven, 
2013). Generally, proposed solutions were practical/
operational with organisational barriers for counsel-
lors that first needed to be addressed at a higher 
level within the organisation14. Upscaling and main-
streaming will depend on the implementation of the 
sixth state reform of activation of minimum income 
recipients, devolved to the regions.
In a case study involving the city of Ghent, local 
job centres appear to be merely local VDAB agen-
cies, rather than broad partnerships in which par-
ties are treated equally, pooling their resources to 
achieve more integrated service delivery (Tem-
merman et al., 2015). The authors identify three 
network-based coordination instruments formally 
intended to strengthen interaction and collaboration 
at local level: local partnership agreement, exec-
utive board, city manager. But none of the three 
instruments turned out positively for network-
ing due to an imbalance in power and resources 
between the actors. It should be stressed, though, 
that these findings are only based on one city. 
A previous evaluation proved that, particularly in 
smaller municipalities, VDAB steering is preferred 
(Struyven & Van Hemel, 2009). By implication, the 
role of VDAB needs to be differentiated to meet 
local specificities. The local job shops rely heav-
ily on VDAB resources; together with the stand-
ardised service model, this makes adopting other 
approaches for the design and management of net-
works, as is the case in a meta governance con-
text, unlikely. Also, once a service delivery model 
is put in place, the need for hierarchical and mar-
ket-based instruments is inevitable. These factors 
overshadow the initial logic of co-production, which 
is more likely to take place at the pre-partnership 
stage of integrated service delivery.
14 Reported barriers in the evaluation study by Van 
Mellaert, Kuppens & Struyven (2013) are: different 
work procedures and organisational cultures, different 
registration systems, pressure to first fill in the available 
places in the own organisation or services already 
commissioned, privacy requirements, the current division 
of responsibilities to follow-up the compliance of 
customers with the conditions related to the reception  
of social or unemployment benefits.
4.6 PES as a conductor  
of public-private partnerships
The first period as a Regisseur during the 2000s 
was characterised by preserving basic services 
within VDAB through co-production in local job 
shops. Tendering was a complementary way to 
enhance capacity and innovation, i.e. taking advan-
tage of other people’s expertise. This evolution 
reflects a process of institutional layering (Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005), where elements of market com-
petition and other types of partnerships emerge, 
but without abandoning the existing structure of 
a PES provider with a guaranteed market share 
(Struyven, 2014). At the same time, the Regisseur 
role gradually became broadly interpreted, while 
tendering and outsourcing turned into relationships 
between customer and contractor. This involved 
more balanced public-private partnerships with 
a range of actors in the transitional labour mar-
ket, such as educational institutes, sectors, local 
government bodies, business enterprises, care 
facilities, temporary agencies, trade unions and 
employer’s associations. While the first type of ten-
dering-based partnership operated within a strict 
framework of capacity shifts outside one’s own 
organisation, responsibility and control, the second 
type of partnership was founded on other princi-
ples: jointly set objectives, shared responsibilities, 
bundling of expertise and the shared contribution 
of resources. Such partnerships vary in the extent 
of their formality and trust becomes paramount. 
The challenges for PES in the initiation and structur-
ing of partnerships are numerous. As an organisa-
tion, PES needs the necessary ability and agility to 
play the role properly. From the perspective of labour 
market governance, there is a certain tension within 
PES’ own organisational objectives. Ultimately, PES 
will always balance the benefits of being involved in 
such networks against the added value of achieving 
their organisational objectives. As described by one 
of the parties involved in VDAB, the actors must "fit 
the script". In such cases, consideration is often given 
to the efficiency of being involved in a joint initia-
tive. Particularly if the initiative was not launched by 
the PES itself, it may consider how to introduce the 
initiative into the organisation over time, which can 
ultimately result in a public-private partnership. Dur-
ing this process, power and resources are often the 
decisive factors. In the case of PES, it derives power 
of legitimacy from its public service mission, which 
requires it to retain control over the entire service 
providing process. 
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Long-term public-private partnerships are often 
based on an awareness of mutual dependency. 
There are several examples of long-term collabora-
tion within VDAB. A prime example involves partner-
ship agreements with business sectors, often jointly 
managed structures of employers’ and employees’ 
associations. These sectoral representatives are 
not only consulted when setting out annual training 
plans, they also act as partners in their implementa-
tion, together with a contribution from jointly man-
aged training funds. This collaboration is more widely 
embedded by decree and what are politically known 
as sector covenants. A recent trend was also identi-
fied within VDAB towards broadening collaboration 
in the field of mediation and internships. For partner-
ships in this field, the PES is obliged to revert to ten-
dering since the provision of guidance in this area is 
defined as a ‘market activity’: i.e. a service for which 
there are also other players on the market. 
Another example of long-term collaboration worth 
highlighting is the coordinating platform of private 
temporary employment agencies. Here, VDAB has 
a history of cooperation with Federgon, the Belgian 
private employment services association comprising 
temporary work agencies, search and selection com-
panies, private training providers and partners pro-
viding other related services. Initially, the cooperation 
was promoted by the government and a first cooper-
ation agreement was signed in 1999. The creation of 
a partnership association between VDAB and Feder-
gon in 2005 was the most influential milestone, fol-
lowed by a second cooperation agreement two years 
later. In practice, the partnership enables the com-
mon funding of activities, better exchange of vacan-
cies, cooperation in the field of career guidance and 
training of jobseekers and employees, and the organ-
isation of outplacement services. Common quality 
assurance systems have also been adopted by both 
the PES and the private employment services asso-
ciation Federgon, which together certify services that 
correspond to these quality standards. The idea that 
the Flemish temporary employment industry could 
contribute to encourage the labour force to meet 
employers’ needs, particularly for vulnerable groups, 
was also at the heart of the subsequent tenders.
Both examples illustrate how a balanced combina-
tion of network- and market-type arrangements, 
in this case cooperation agreements and tender-
ing, can underpin successful service delivery. This 
requires a minimum level of power and resources 
for both parties, which in turn makes it less likely for 
less powerful actors (e.g. small community organi-
sations) to be involved.  
4.7 PES as a conductor  
of digital services
In addition to contracting-out, co-production in 
local job shops and public-private partnerships, 
a fourth trend is emerging in the PES conduct-
ing role, namely, the co-creation of digital ser-
vices. Although this already began in the 1990s, it 
has only recently been considered the most radi-
cal development since the founding of VDAB as an 
autonomous Flemish government agency in 1989. 
This has all to do with the incorporation of the dig-
ital society into VDAB’s operations and the drive 
to match supply to demand in the labour market 
by providing digital services. The digital society has 
become paramount not only to the VDAB, but also 
to the way the labour market itself functions. As 
a starting point, digitalisation can help labour mar-
ket services develop autonomously in the market, 
without government intervention or any help from 
VDAB. The crucial question for VDAB is then how it 
can play a directing role to benefit autonomous pro-
vision of services? Its role as a conductor of digital 
services covers two aspects: the control of labour 
market information and the control of labour mar-
ket technology.
Firstly, this involves the intelligent matching of 
labour supply and demand. For more than a dec-
ade, jobseekers have been connected to available 
vacancies through the automated matching tool 
(‘Elise’). More recently, this function has been sup-
ported by a content management system that auto-
matically messages jobseekers when opportunities 
come up, and follows up with reminders. The Flem-
ish PES uses ‘Competent’, an existing classification 
of competency profiles created by the various social 
partners in the SERV15, starting from the ROME 3 
framework for competences and competency pro-
files developed by the French PES (Pôle emploi). 
VDAB then links a candidate’s competencies with 
its own ‘translation’ algorithm (‘Komeet’), which 
matches the candidate to specific vacancies. This 
is similar to the online tool offered to the employer 
to manage vacancies.
15 The Flanders Social and Economic Council (SERV)  
is the advisory body of Flemish employers and  
employees to the Flemish authorities.
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There are a number of advantages to the auto-
mated matching system (Leroy & De Haeck, 2014):
 ● it takes place early in the process and can 
be used more frequently, which can help 
to prevent candidates becoming long-term 
unemployed;
 ● where matching does not work, PES counsel-
lors are notified to intervene quickly and act 
accordingly;
 ● competence-based matching enables more 
refined and qualitative mediation;
 ● instead of focusing on qualifications, employers 
and counsellors are encouraged to widen the 
scope on competencies, which can be vital to 
filling bottleneck vacancies.
Secondly, there are common platforms and tools 
to improve the efficiency and transparency of the 
labour market (e-portfolios, e-guidance, e-learning, 
etc.). The online ‘Mijn Loopbaan’ (My Career) plat-
form is a specific career management tool installed 
by the Flemish PES. The platform was introduced in 
2012 to help people collect and manage their career 
information. Registered customers can link their 
personal profile to suitable vacancies and training 
opportunities. As the system is updated with infor-
mation about skills and competences, it is moving 
towards an Amazon-like e-service based on compe-
tences instead of qualifications. The advantage for 
the customer is that jobs are grouped by competency 
requirements, some of which they may not have 
considered before. Likewise, employers’ needs are 
connected to employee profiles to put forward can-
didates they might not have previously considered.
Thirdly, with a view to developing new ‘open ser-
vices’, VDAB is now offering the market a wealth 
of information sources and tools. VDAB already 
receives requests for data from market actors and 
these tools help them improve their own services and 
develop applications and websites of their own. This 
will help third parties to match CVs to job vacan-
cies, for example, by giving VDAB the opportunity to 
unlock and enrich data by combining information. It 
will also encourage the development of new services 
by the market itself. This process of digitalisation is 
seen as a way to rationalise resources and improve 
efficiency. The services currently offered are: a com-
petence service (to describe job vacancies based on 
competences), a matching service16, a vacancy ser-
16 The VDAB matching system has been bought by Malta 
PES. This allows further investments by VDAB and lends 
credibility to VDAB in this context. 
vice, an online assistant service (to improve the qual-
ity of job descriptions), and a CV service. This offers 
the VDAB the following advantages:
 ● investment costs are borne outside their own 
organisation and the relevant government 
agencies;
 ● VDAB stimulates competence-based matching;
 ● VDAB can supplement its data with information 
from market players;
 ● VDAB can incorporate new services from the 
market. 
Ultimately, VDAB aims to offer services ‘anywhere, 
anytime, anyhow’ – which can also be interpreted 
as ‘regardless of which party they are offered by’. 
Fundamentally, it makes no difference which party 
initiates the job-match. What is important is that 
the match was made, and the ultimate criterion is 
whether this benefits the operation of the labour 
market. 
This immediately raises the question whether PES 
is responsible for the operation of the entire labour 
market, and, if not, can the additional information 
held on the PES database actually improve the 
counselling offered to job seekers? Crucial infor-
mation is, for example, being collected by the busi-
ness community in the context of recruitment and 
selection. This is information that is typically not 
shared and generates technical and legal questions 
around privacy, property and user rights, none of 
which have yet been answered. 
However, the search for answers has already begun 
at the organisational level and VDAB is prioritis-
ing its work with partners to identify a joint solu-
tion. This may require an autonomous legal form 
such as a public-private partnership, which should 
lead to a win-win situation. VDAB could also agree 
to share information in the opposite direction or 
to provide a referral to VDAB services. Once it has 
been developed, VDAB can encourage innovation by 
offering the new service independently. Joint invest-
ments can also be made to maintain and expand 
the new service. Rather than collaborating to pro-
vide physical services, basic services will no longer 
have to fall under the auspices of the government. 
This means that the core tasks of matching and pro-
viding advice to customers can be left to informa-
tion networks developed by the market in ad hoc 
arrangements with the PES. Organisational bound-
aries become more fluid, meaning PES increas-
ingly becomes an organisation of networks. A lot 
will depend on the development of new services. 
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The partnership is currently framed as a co-creation 
rather than a co-production. As it grows, the need for 
a regulating framework will increase too, particularly 
to lay down rules for managing and using informa-
tion by means of regulations, procedures and qual-
ity benchmarks. The hierarchical mode of governance 
will also become more important in this field.
To sum up this section, the ultimate goal is the com-
bination of the conductor role with the digital soci-
ety, potentially impacting strongly on public service 
production and delivery (various digital services to 
enhance labour market transparency and matching 
processes). This emerges as a new institutional logic 
based on big data, digital concepts and templates 
(Pedersen & Aagaard, 2015), in addition to (or as 
a substitute for) a more conventional logic based 
on physical service delivery. The new logic focuses 
on performance assessment. It also underpins how 
conventional, physical services are managed, since 
service production is driven by performance meas-
urement systems on quality, effects, efficiency, costs, 
user-satisfaction, etc. Arguments in favour of digital-
isation often stem from the principle that it can sup-
port counsellors in their tasks by freeing up time they 
can then spend on cases that need a more intensive 
and personal approach. Whether this will happen in 
practice is still an open question.
Based on the case of VDAB, a number of precon-
ditions need fulfilling before considering a conduc-
tor role for digital services. First and foremost, it 
requires a considerable amount of data on vacan-
cies and technological know-how to manage it. VDAB 
was already a pioneer in the early 1990s when it 
developed technologically sophisticated administra-
tive systems. The integration of labour market data 
led to ICT-based forms of job brokerage using the 
Work Information System (WIS), introduced in 1994, 
with easily accessible kiosks from which jobseek-
ers could consult the vacancy database themselves; 
posting vacancies on the VDAB website (1995) and 
KISS (Candidates Information and Selection System), 
introduced for employers in 1996. The central data-
base and ICT-based services generated international 
praise for VDAB as one of the most advanced job 
brokerage systems in the world (Leroy, 2000; Lan-
duyt 2000). The electronic self-help tools formed an 
important part of the basic service for jobseekers 
and employers. The subsequent cooperation agree-
ments with Federgon, developed to connect streams 
of advertisements for vacant posts, have created 
a considerable market share of all the vacancies 
reported on the PES database17.
When it comes to automated skill-based matching, 
it is vital to take into account both relevant techni-
cal and soft skills. This approach undoubtedly adds 
value to many routine jobs requiring lower qualifica-
tions. Such categories are often the ones supervised 
by PES. The chances of matching may increase when 
the system takes into account other skills to compen-
sate the lack of a formal degree. However, with the 
new contingent of jobseekers offering higher levels 
of education, qualifications cannot simply be ignored. 
It is also vital from an economic perspective that 
graduates can enter the labour market at the level 
that equates with their qualifications. Skills-based 
matching then provides added value depending on 
the nature of the qualification, its relevance to the 
labour market and often issues of demand. Finally, 
replacing physical services with digital, information-
driven services is based on the assumption that self-
reliant customers, when left to their own devices, will 
access suitable jobs. Thus far, there is no conclusive 
evidence to support this debate. 
17 Data on the penetration rate from VDAB and the share  
of vacancies are not available. Note that the VDAB 
database integrates not only the VDAB registered 
vacancies but also vacancy databases from the private 
sector through a cooperation agreement with the  
body of temporary work agencies and some job 
advertisement companies. 
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5. CONCLUSION
The PES 2020 Strategy puts the conductor role 
under the spotlight for PES across the EU. While 
several Member States took steps towards ‘con-
ducting’ long before the label emerged, the wider 
reaching breakthrough came in 2010. Indeed with 
TLM, PES were encouraged to perform within 
a holistic strategy, based on collaboration and part-
nerships within the context of a broader configura-
tion of stakeholders and other actors. 
This analytical paper mapped the evolving role of 
the national PES as a conductor in light of that 
strategy. The empirical section, based on the Bel-
gian (Flemish) case, highlighted significant work 
that has already been done to understand what it 
means to take up a conductor (regisseur) role in the 
labour market.
The new strategy is framed within a ‘partnership 
and network’ approach. Networking, in the role of 
a conductor, is important but in the real world PES 
are expected to control all aspects of the govern-
ing process through their monopoly on unemploy-
ment benefits and their grip on the referral process. 
This is true for the majority, if not all, PES in Europe. 
We conclude that behind the label of ‘conducting’, 
there is more than simply coordination through 
partnerships and networks. In practice, there is an 
evolution from a single mode of governance towards 
a multiple mode combining characteristics from all 
three modes of governance, i.e. hierarchy, markets 
and networks. As is shown in the case of the Flem-
ish employment service, conducting is not limited 
to the network mode of governance. A key element 
of the conducting role is the interaction with other 
actors, regardless of the mode of governance. More-
over, the mix of governance changes over time. On 
the one hand, in particular when it comes to service 
delivery, the hierarchical mode of governance tends 
to overshadow the initial market- and network-type 
modes of governance. On the other hand, new initi-
atives continue to emerge within a logic of co-pro-
duction and metagovernance. Both dynamics occur 
simultaneously and lead to more hierarchical govern-
ance and more market and network governance at 
the same time. A key factor for the PES case study 
(VDAB), and one likely to be for other advanced PES 
systems, is to keep key processes of labour market 
information and matching under public control in an 
increasingly digital labour market. In this way, PES as 
a conductor does end PES as we know, but becomes 
a catalyst for its reinvention as a prime public service.
In cases where there is also a competitive advantage 
in labour market information, it is likely that they will 
control the shift towards a more information-driven 
job brokerage system. We conclude that embracing 
this multiple role as a conductor in this domain offers 
the chance for a PES to reinvent itself.
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